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26 THE BAR EXAMINER, MAY 2001
I. INTRODUCTION.
The application of the constitutional free expression
guarantee to the activities of the organized bar is one
of the most important unexplored areas of legal
ethics. In this essay I will consider in particular the
question of whether an applicant may be denied
admission to the bar for involvement with hateful or
discriminatory activities. This question reveals the
tension between the First Amendment principle,
established after the agonizing struggles of the
McCarthy era, that no one may be denied member-
ship in the bar because of his or her beliefs alone, and
the plenary authority of bar associations to make
predictive judgments about the character and fitness
of applicants and their ability to function as lawyers.
It is also the most recent iteration of the running
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clash between two constitutional values—freedom
of speech, as enshrined in the First Amendment, and
racial equality, embodied in the Fourteenth.2 Courts
that have considered the constitutional issues posed
by restrictions on expressive activities of lawyers are
badly split. This uncertainty is due in part to the wel-
ter of constitutional rules implicated by any restric-
tions on speech, but also by the categorization prob-
lems presented by lawyers’ speech. Are lawyers like
soapbox orators in Hyde Park, or are they more like
government employees, whose expressive rights
may be limited? Is lawyer speech “political,” and
therefore entitled to the highest degree of First
Amendment protection, or in a category of lower
constitutional value, like commercial speech? Do
lawyers surrender a portion of their expressive free-
dom when they become members of the bar, “officers
of the court,” as judges are fond of labeling them?
How should courts reconcile the solicitude of the
First Amendment for unorthodox points of view and
spirited dissent with the regulatory interests of the
bar, which may not necessarily be furthered by anti-
establishment speech by lawyers?
In this essay I will discuss the constitutional
issues presented in bar admissions cases by focusing
on the controversy surrounding the application of
Matthew Hale, an avowed white supremacist, to the
Illinois bar. The Illinois bar committee denied Hale’s
application on the ground that he was unlikely to
comply with a state disciplinary rule prohibiting
racial discrimination. As this case shows, the appli-
cation of hate speech regulations to the organized
bar is complicated by the disciplinary structure
under which lawyers operate, and by the ethical tra-
ditions of the practice of law. These normative frame-
works may, in some cases, impose conflicting duties
on lawyers. On the one hand, lawyers are expected
to act as loyal advocates, advisors, and confidants to
their clients. (Charles Fried memorably referred to
the lawyer as the client’s “special-purpose friend.”3)
This obligation requires a kind of devotion to client
causes that may be incompatible with ordinary
antidiscrimination norms, creating an opposition
between ethical and legal norms. For instance, in a
recent state civil rights agency action, a woman
divorce lawyer was fined for her stated intent to
accept only women as clients, and ordered to work
on behalf of men as well as women.4 In that case, the
lawyer’s personal moral agency and her ideological
commitment to serving women were at opposition
with the principle of formal gender equality
(although her decision arguably advanced substan-
tive gender equality by providing women with effec-
tive counsel). On the other hand, lawyers are held to
be “officers of the court,” charged with responsibili-
ty for conforming the conduct of individuals to the
law.5 This obligation obviously stands in tension
with the lawyer’s duty to advocate her client’s cause
zealously; the conflict here is well known in legal
ethics and has been the occasion of a great deal of
thoughtful scholarship.6
It is a commonplace in political thought that
“negative” liberty—that is, the absence of govern-
ment restraints on individual autonomy—is incom-
patible with a state regime that seeks to advance a
particular vision of human flourishing.7 In the bar
admissions and hate-speech cases, courts must grap-
ple with a question of priority, namely, whether to
elevate the constitutional value of racial equality
over the expressive and associational liberties of
lawyers and bar applicants. My claim is that the
bar’s attempt to deny admission to lawyers who
espouse hateful positions is admirable, and is cer-
tainly consonant with “positive” liberty, in other
words with a substantive conception of a good soci-
ety. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court
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has continually interpreted the First Amendment as
emphasizing negative liberty in cases where expres-
sive interests conflict with the state’s attempt to vin-
dicate substantive values such as racial and gender
equality. In the absence of the special obligations
imposed on lawyers as officers of the court, the con-
stitutional questions presented by a state-imposed
admissions regulation that discriminated on the
basis of an applicant’s viewpoint would be relative-
ly straightforward. Even where the ethical duties
associated with the lawyer’s role are taken into
account, however, the constitutional balance still tips
in favor of the individual expressive liberties.
The reason, in short, for favoring First
Amendment rights is that lawyers must be free to
represent unpopular clients, dissenters, and those
who oppose powerful state and private institutions.
One natural rejoinder to this position is that “the
book is closed” on ideas like Matthew Hale’s white
supremacist beliefs. As disgusting as Hale’s beliefs
are, however, the prospect of giving bar associations,
court committees, or other state actors power to
weed out applicants on the basis of the social accept-
ability of their value commitments should give one
pause. History has shown that restrictions that are
enforced against the “bad guys” (let us say, the ene-
mies of liberal political causes) can easily be turned
around and used against the good guys—witness the
use of anti-pornography statutes in Canada as a
basis for demanding that bookstores remove the
works of Andrea Dworkin,8 and the disciplinary
action against the Massachusetts judge who attend-
ed a gay rights rally.9 A decision permitting Illinois to
exclude Hale from the bar seems ripe for abuse the
next time a flamboyant lawyer for a marginalized
group applies for a law license. For this reason, the
racist beliefs of Matthew Hale are paradoxically a
reason to favor his admission to the bar. Although in
the particular case we certainly have cause to regret
the conferring of a law license on the applicant, the
general principle that the state may not discriminate
on the basis of the viewpoint of a bar applicant is of
surpassing importance.
The Hale case implicates two central features of
modern First Amendment law, which I will discuss
in detail: the principle of viewpoint-neutrality and
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Under the
former, state regulations on expression must be justi-
fied without reference to the speaker’s viewpoint;
thus, state actors such as court committees and inte-
grated bar associations may not exclude someone
like Matthew Hale while at the same time admitting
a lawyer who admits to an intention to work only on
behalf of progressive causes. If a lawyer is permitted
to work for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, repre-
senting only African-American clients, the perhaps
regrettable constitutional tradeoff is that Matthew
Hale is equally entitled to represent only white
clients in the cause of white supremacy, to the extent
his cause can be furthered lawfully. The unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine states that a state actor
may not confer government benefits, such as a
license to practice law, with strings attached. In other
words, the state may not condition a privilege or
license on the applicant’s agreement to refrain from
engaging in some constitutionally protected activity,
such as speaking out in the pursuit of an unpopular
cause. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, attempt-
ed to undermine the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine when the expressive liberties of lawyers are
at stake, most recently in the case of Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada.10 The Gentile opinion is frequently mis-
applied by courts, and has created a great deal of
confusion in the analysis of the Hale case.
II. THE HALE CASE.
The case of Matthew Hale has crystalized the debate
over the First Amendment rights of attorneys in bar
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admissions proceedings, in a way that has not
occurred since the McCarthy era’s loyalty-oath and
character and fitness cases.11 Hale is the leader (the
self-styled “Pontifex Maximus”) of a white suprema-
cist organization called the World Church of the
Creator, undistinguished among lunatic fringe hate
groups for its beliefs,12 but notable for its enthusiastic
embrace of technology. His organization has been
particularly aggressive in using the World Wide Web
to spread its message. Hale maintains a Web site for
his organization, which contains numerous exhorta-
tions to “racial loyalty” and “racial holy war”; ranti-
ngs about blacks, Jews, and other ethnic minorities
(called the “mud races” by Hale); a bizarre theology
based on the “Sixteen Commandments” and vehe-
ment denunciations of Christianity; long-discredited
bogus biological theories about racial differences;
and a boilerplate disclaimer that the group does not
condone violence.13 The disclaimer rings hollow in
the face of the group’s refusal to disavow violence in
the pursuit of its ambitions: “It is the program of the
Church of the Creator to keep expanding the White
Race and keep crowding the mud races without nec-
essarily engaging in any open warfare or without nec-
essarily killing anybody.”14 And few believed that
Hale was not pleased when one of his followers,
Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, went on a three-state
killing spree targeted at Jews and people of color.15
Due to the visibility of the World Church of the
Creator, Hale’s application to become a licensed
attorney in Illinois was a high-profile event, and the
decision of the character and fitness committee of the
Illinois Supreme Court, declining to certify his fit-
ness for admission, generated immediate controver-
sy.16 Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied certio-
rari on his petition,17 Hale has since applied for and
been denied admission to the Montana Bar,18 ensur-
ing that these issues will remain in the spotlight for
the foreseeable future.
Despite the horror of the Smith killings, the Hale
proceeding is a tempest in a teapot compared with
the great upheaval surrounding Senator Joseph
McCarthy’s investigations into alleged Communist
infiltration of American political institutions in the
1950s.19 The McCarthy era produced an extraordi-
nary outpouring of sharply divided Supreme Court
opinions, all considering the extent of constitutional
protection afforded to those who were suspected of
harboring Communist sympathies.20 A significant
number of these cases involved lawyers who were
denied admission to state bar associations, some-
times merely for refusing to answer questions about
membership in subversive organizations.21 The hold-
ings of those cases, none of which has been over-
ruled expressly by the Court, may be surprising to a
lawyer who is acquainted only with contemporary
free speech jurisprudence, which is highly protective
of potentially harmful speech. Although applicants
to the bar may not be required to disclose mere mem-
bership in “subversive” organizations,22 they never-
theless may be forced to reveal whether they belong
to an organization advocating overthrow of the gov-
ernment by force and whether they share that
group’s specific intent.23 The Court cited a long line
of decisions establishing the permissibility of condi-
tioning government employment on a satisfactory
record of the applicant’s freedom from subversive
activity.24 Indeed, the bar admission cases and other
anti-Communist loyalty-oath cases25 were decided
after the Supreme Court’s landmark Brandenburg
decision, which generally imposes a requirement
that the harm threatened by speech be imminent in
time. Thus, the Hale case poses an unresolved con-
stitutional question of the highest importance—
namely, whether a state benefit may be withheld on
a showing that the applicant poses a particularly
acute threat to the democratic form of government.
30 THE BAR EXAMINER, MAY 2001
The Illinois Supreme Court committee’s inquiry
panel considering Hale’s application was aware of
the loyalty-oath cases proscribing inquiry into beliefs
as such, but it nevertheless concluded that the state’s
interest in ensuring that lawyers are dedicated to cer-
tain “fundamental truths” outweighed Hale’s First
Amendment rights.26 These fundamental truths
include racial equality and the responsibility of the
courts to enforce this value. The inquiry panel cited
the Supreme Court’s holding in Baird that “a State
may not inquire about a man’s views or associations
solely for the purpose of withholding a right or ben-
efit because of what he believes.”27 The panel’s
attempts to distinguish inquiry into belief as such
and belief as it reveals an intent to commit unlawful
acts reveal both constitutional questions left open by
the McCarthy-era jurisprudence of the Court and
the issues posed by the collision between anti-
discrimination norms and free expression principles.
First, the inquiry panel in the Hale case empha-
sized the difference between inquiring into beliefs
and merely taking notice of beliefs that an applicant
has publicized: “Matthew Hale has no interest in
keeping his beliefs a secret.”28 It is true that the pre-
cise issue in Baird was whether the state of Arizona
could deny admission to an applicant who had
refused to answer questions about membership in
“the Communist Party or any organization that
advocates overthrow of the United States Gov-
ernment by force or violence.”29 It seems peculiar to
read Baird so narrowly—for the proposition that the
state may not inquire into membership in organiza-
tions advocating violent overthrow of the United
State government, but may permissibly deny mem-
bership in the bar to an applicant who has admitted
membership in such a group, perhaps through inad-
vertence, naivete, or misplaced trust in the tolerance
of the government. But the Supreme Court is respon-
sible for encouraging this strained interpretation,
because it never squarely confronted the issue sug-
gested by Baird—whether Arizona could have
denied admission to Sara Baird if she had filled out
her application truthfully. In a contemporaneous
decision, the Court insisted that a state retains the
power to inquire into whether a bar applicant had
the specific intent to further the aims of an organ-
ization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the
United States government.30 The only prohibited
inquiry is into beliefs as such, which do not mani-
fest themselves as a specific intent to commit illegal
acts.31 Still, this distinction does not complete the
Illinois inquiry panel’s analysis. Hale never admit-
ted forming a specific intent to commit acts of racial
violence; in fact, he specifically disavowed this
intent.32 One might disbelieve Hale on this point, but
the inquiry panel’s decision does not contain a factu-
al finding, supported by evidence on the record, that
Hale has a specific intent to accomplish a criminal
act. All that is apparent from the record is Hale’s
belief in white supremacy—odious to be sure, but
constitutionally protected.
The inquiry panel, perhaps anticipating this
argument, then waded into the quagmire of consti-
tutional issues surrounding the application of free
expression principles to regulation of hate speech. It
concluded that the fundamental value of racial
equality is so basic to our legal system that it ought
to be preferred to the values of the First
Amendment.33 To call this a novel argument would
be a gross understatement. The Supreme Court, and
federal appellate courts, have consistently held that
speech may not be restricted solely because of its
content, even where the regulations are motivated
by the desire to vindicate substantive norms of racial
equality. For example, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the
Court invalidated a city ordinance criminalizing
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actions that “arouse[ ] anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender.”34 The Court reasoned that the ordinance
discriminated on the basis of the content of the
expression; a sign arguing for racial tolerance would
not be subject to the ordinance, but a message con-
veying hatred or racial superiority would be illegal.35
Significantly, the state interest asserted by the city—
“help[ing] ensure the basic human rights of mem-
bers of groups that have historically been subject to
discrimination”36—is the same interest that the
Illinois inquiry panel claimed justified Hale’s exclu-
sion from the bar. The ordinance was not necessary
to advance this interest, however. In an allusion to
the “marketplace of ideas” vision of the First
Amendment, the Court in R.A.V. said that if the St.
Paul city council wished to respond to hate speech,
its only option was to speak out against hate, not to
ban expressions of it.37
The inquiry panel’s only response to this argu-
ment was a citation to Wisconsin v. Mitchell,38 the
Supreme Court decision unanimously upholding the
constitutionality of a state penalty enhancement pro-
vision for crimes committed as a result of racial bias.
Mitchell essentially recapitulates the distinction
drawn in Wadmond and Baird, between beliefs as
such, and criminal acts motivated by beliefs. A sen-
tencing judge may not take into account a defen-
dant’s beliefs, as might be evidenced by membership
in a white supremacist prison gang, having nothing
to do with the actus reus of the crime for which the
defendant was convicted.39 If racist beliefs motivated
the defendant’s actions, however, the sentencing
judge may take those beliefs into account.40 Similarly,
under Baird, a state may not inquire into a bar appli-
cant’s membership in subversive organizations, but
it is permitted by Wadmond to take into account evi-
dence that the applicant had formed the specific
intent to overthrow the United States government by
force.41 The Court distinguished between conduct,
which could be made the subject of criminal penal-
ties, and expression, which under R.A.V. could not.42
The problem with this position of the inquiry panel,
however, was the lack of any factual record that Hale
had engaged in criminal conduct. For the same rea-
son that the inquiry panel’s application of Baird was
incorrect—namely, Hale had only advocated race
war, not formed the specific intent to commit racial-
ly motivated crimes—the inquiry panel seriously
misread Mitchell when it argued that antidiscrimina-
tion values may be preferred to the First Amendment
in bar admission cases like Hale’s.
Of course, the Minnesota teenager charged with
the cross-burning in R.A.V. was not a lawyer; per-
haps Hale ought to be required to accept diminished
free speech rights in exchange for the valuable privi-
lege of practicing law in Illinois. Indeed, the inquiry
panel makes exactly this argument: “The balance of
values we strike leaves Matthew Hale free . . . to
incite as much racial hatred as he desires. . . . But in
our view he cannot do this as an officer of the
court.”43 Many students of constitutional law will
immediately be put in mind of Holmes’s notorious
statement, from an opinion written as a justice on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that a person
“may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”44
The so-called right/privilege distinction has been
repudiated on several occasions by the Supreme
Court, only to reappear in a different guise a few
years later. It is particularly prevalent in lawyer
discipline cases in which lawyers claim First
Amendment protection.
On Hale’s appeal from the inquiry panel’s deci-
sion, a separate five-member panel of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s character and fitness committee
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(which I will refer to as the hearing panel) affirmed
the denial of Hale’s application to the bar, on the nar-
row ground that Hale had not proven that he was
willing to abide by the state’s disciplinary rules for
lawyers.45 Specifically, the record, including Hale’s
extravagantly racist Web site and a letter he had
written using a racial epithet, indicated that he
would be unable to put aside his white supremacist
beliefs and abide by Illinois Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.4(a)5, which provides:
A lawyer shall not . . . engage in adverse dis-
criminatory treatment of litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others, based on
race, sex, religion, or national origin.46
Significantly, however, the hearing panel did not
allege that any of Hale’s actions were illegal, nor that
they revealed a specific intent to commit an illegal
act. Were it not for the Illinois disciplinary rule pro-
hibiting racial discrimination, the hearing panel’s
argument would be foreclosed by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Baird.
Is the evidence that Hale would be unable to
comply with Rule 8.4(a)5 a constitutionally permissi-
ble basis to deny Hale admission to the bar? The
answer turns on whether the rule itself is constitu-
tionally sound. There is nothing unconstitutional (as
opposed to wrongheaded) with a bar association
committee making predictive judgments about an
applicant’s fitness to practice law, provided that the
committee does not rely on evidence of beliefs as
such, as opposed to conduct which reveals character
incompatible with the role of lawyer. Applicants are
frequently denied permission to sit for the bar exam
on the basis of evidence showing alcohol dependen-
cy, serious financial difficulties, a criminal record,
academic dishonesty, or even impulse control prob-
lems, on the grounds that they are more likely to be
involved in some kind of breach of professional stan-
dards if admitted.47 Moreover, even if Illinois lawyers
are never disbarred for violating Rule 8.4(a)5, the
character and fitness committee could still use Hale’s
prospective violation of the rule as a basis for exclud-
ing him from the bar. Numerous decisions have
affirmed orders denying applications for admission
where the applicant’s conduct would not have
warranted disbarment if committed by a licensed
lawyer.48 These decisions strike me as seriously
flawed as a matter of regulatory policy.49 They are
not, however, incorrectly decided as a matter of
constitutional law. Although the state could not
criminalize the status of being an alcoholic,50 it may
rely on evidence of this status to make a forward-
looking judgment about the likelihood that an appli-
cant to the bar will be unable to function as a lawyer.
Similarly, the state could not attach criminal sanc-
tions to speech that represents “mere abstract teach-
ing” of the necessity of resorting to violence,51 but 
the unconstitutionality of such a statute does not, 
by itself, establish that evidence of advocating racist
violence is off limits as a basis for exclusion from 
the bar.
To illustrate the extensive regulatory authority
ordinarily enjoyed by the organized bar, consider a
case that was decided contemporaneously with the
Matthew Hale controversy by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska. In that case, In re Converse,52 the Nebraska
court approved the decision of that state’s bar asso-
ciation to deny admission to an applicant who had
caused endless headaches to faculty and administra-
tors at his law school, by writing letters to local
newspapers, threatening to sue over the school’s
request that he remove a nude photograph from his
library carrel, publicly accusing the dean of incom-
petence and corruption, and printing and selling
“Deanie on a Weenie” T-shirts, depicting the dean
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“astride what appears to be a large hot dog.”53 There
is no doubt that this student was a pain in the neck,
but the harm created by his speech pales in compar-
ison with the hatred and terror created by Hale’s
white-supremacist Web site and organization.
Nevertheless, although the Hale case has attracted
the attention of high-profile constitutional lawyers,
who claim that it is a classic First Amendment case,54
the denial of Paul Converse’s application to the
Nebraska bar was unanimously affirmed by the
court, and attracted hardly a whimper of protest
from the civil libertarians flocking to Hale’s defense. 
What explains the difference in these cases? The
answer turns on the ability of the Nebraska Supreme
Court to characterize all of Converse’s activities as
conduct, which could be used as evidence of his unfit-
ness to practice law.55 At this point, however, the
court’s constitutional analysis became muddled. It
assumed arguendo that Converse’s expressive con-
duct was protected by the First Amendment. It then
interpreted the McCarthy-era loyalty-oath cases as
permitting a bar association to inquire into protected
expression which bears on an applicant’s moral char-
acter. But the distinction articulated in Baird and
Wadmond was not between expression and character,
but between beliefs as such, and membership in an
organization combined with the specific intent to
further an unlawful end.56 There is no suggestion in
the Converse opinion that Paul Converse acted
unlawfully; if anything, his conduct was hyper-legal-
istic—threatening lawsuits over trifles, accusing oth-
ers of serious illegality, and translating interpersonal
disputes into juridical terms.
The kernel of a constitutionally sound basis for
denying Converse’s application is located in
Converse’s record of lawsuits and outbursts, for they
show that he has a tendency to overreact to per-
ceived offenses and employ legal and extralegal
processes to harass and intimidate others. By writing
letters to the newspaper (carbon-copied to two
prominent federal judges), rallying other students to
trash a professor who had treated Converse harshly
in class, and printing the infamous “Deanie on a
Weenie” hot dog shirt, Converse showed that he was
not inclined to resolve disputes in an orderly man-
ner.57 Of course, the same could be said about
Matthew Hale—he is apt to seek social change
through extralegal methods such as exhorting fol-
lowers to “racial holy war.” The only distinction,
therefore, between the two cases is that Hale’s
expression has so far taken the form of pure speech,
while Converse’s had crossed the line into conduct.
In both cases the bar was making a predictive judg-
ment about the compatibility of the character of the
applicants with the character required of lawyers.
What apparently makes the Hale decision a signifi-
cant constitutional case, worthy of the intervention
of Alan Dershowitz, is that his hatefulness is mani-
fested in speech alone, while Converse’s case lan-
guishes in obscurity because he had actually acted on
his character. This seems to be a flimsy reed on which
to hang the constitutional protection afforded to
beliefs, but bar admissions cases have consistently
permitted state bar associations to inquire into a
broad range of conduct that is held to be probative of
one’s future fitness for practicing law. This inquiry is
extremely narrowly circumscribed by the First
Amendment under Baird and Wadmond, probably
less so than many lawyers appreciate.
It is interesting to speculate about what would
happen if the Hale case, or one like it, made it to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Would the Court take that
opportunity to bring bar admissions cases more in
line with contemporary First Amendment law,
which is broadly protective of hateful speech, and
even the advocacy of illegal action, provided that the
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danger is not imminent, clear, and present? Or
would the Court continue effectively to carve out an
exception for expressive activities by lawyers, who
are subject to heightened state regulation? In my
judgment, the more satisfying resolution of these
tensions would be to treat the Hale case more like
R.A.V. and Brandenburg, prohibiting state bar associ-
ations from denying membership to odious charac-
ters who have not crossed the line into unlawful con-
duct. But this resolution would fly in the face of the
extremely deferential approach of state courts, who
tend to approve of state bar decisions in cases like
Converse, for reasons related to the public esteem and
image of the legal profession.
The bottom line on the constitutionality of the
Hale decision is that the character and fitness com-
mittee of the court could refuse to certify Hale for
admission only under very stringent conditions.58 In
practice, however, these prerequisites are difficult, if
not impossible, to establish. The constitutional lati-
tude to deny admission to Hale is dependent upon
establishing the following propositions: (a) the con-
duct engaged in by Hale which is purportedly pro-
hibited by Rule 8.4(a)5 occurred in a context that
would be germane to Hale’s performance of his
duties as a lawyer; (b) the committee did not make
illegitimate use of evidence of Hale’s beliefs, as
opposed to actions which evidence his inability to
refrain from racial discrimination; and (c) the factual
record supports the inferences drawn by the com-
mittee. Many of these assumptions may turn out not
to be supportable. For instance, the evidence of
Hale’s advocacy of white-supremacist causes may
not support the inference that he will be unable to
put aside his racist views and comply with Rule
8.4(a)5.59 And several of the incidents of racism relied
upon by the committee occurred in private settings,
proving nothing about Hale’s ability to keep his
beliefs in check and conform to professional rules
prohibiting discrimination by lawyers in their
professional capacities.60
It bears emphasizing, too, that refusing admis-
sion to Hale would be a bad decision for reasons
relating not to the constitution, but to the ethical
duties of lawyers. “Abolitionists, civil rights
activists, suffragists, and labor organizers—indeed,
the architects of our constitutional framework—all
were guilty of ‘disrespect for law’ in precisely the
same sense that bar examiners employ it.”61 Anti-
death penalty activists may be accused of exhibiting
disrespect for the law in the same way. In fact, Justice
Scalia has leveled just such a charge, decrying the
“guerilla tactics” of defense lawyers who seek to
delay their clients’ executions by all legally available
means.62 Challenging conventional wisdom about
the state of the law is a noble aspect of the lawyer’s
role. It does not matter that Hale takes issue with
a legal principle that most people consider funda-
mental. Racial segregation and the juridical inequal-
ity of women were deemed orthodox moral princi-
ples at one time. Of course, the natural response 
is, “we’re right and they were wrong,” but it is pre-
cisely the traditional function of lawyers to occasion-
ally shake up our most cherished beliefs about right
and wrong.
There is no doubt that Hale’s views will not pre-
vail in the marketplace of ideas, and for that we
should all be grateful, but it does not follow that his
advocacy of white supremacy is socially valueless.
Perhaps it is important, as Lee Bollinger has argued,
that we discipline ourselves as a society to tolerate
odious characters, in order to acquire virtues that are
necessary in a democratic polity.63 One might also
argue, from a legal-process standpoint, that lawyers
are not supposed to represent truth and virtue, but
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clients, who may be right or wrong about moral
issues.64 Barring a white-supremacist lawyer on the
basis of the hatefulness of his beliefs risks establish-
ing a principle that a lawyer may be denied admis-
sion for espousing a viewpoint at odds with the
mores of the time. Certainly if the basis for exclusion
is Hale’s advocacy of a principle that is at odds with
then-prevailing law, it is hard to see why this princi-
ple cannot be extended to deny admission to lawyers
who believe in the unconstitutionality of the death
penalty, the immorality of sodomy statutes, or the
wrongness of Roe v. Wade.65 Finally, adopting the clas-
sic civil-libertarian defense of freedom of speech, one
might argue that Hale’s advocacy of white suprema-
cy may have the incidental benefit of strengthening
the legal protection of speech for all marginalized
members of society.66 The ACLU, for example, takes
the consequentialist (and controversial) position that
the protection of odious speech is justified because it
establishes legal principles that can be relied upon by
civil rights activists in future cases.67
. . . 
III. CONCLUSION.
The epigraph from Justice Black which opened this
essay captures the delicate balancing task which
presents itself to bar examiners upon evidence that
an applicant is likely to engage in racial discrimina-
tion or other hateful acts. I do not believe, however,
that the solution to this problem is to create some
kind of balancing test, in which the interests of the
lawyer, the court system, potentially affected third
parties, and society generally are weighed against
one another on some miraculous multidimensional
scale.68 A significant camp of First Amendment schol-
ars contends that flexibility and “thinking small” is
the hallmark of free speech doctrine, and courts
should not be preoccupied with the search for rules
that apply without sensitivity to contextual varia-
tions.69 There is a great deal of truth in this position,
but the response to the diversity of circumstances of
individual cases is to work harder to discern the
principles and policies which undergird First
Amendment adjudication in analogous cases, not to
abdicate this function by purporting to balance
numerous incommensurable factors. How, for ex-
ample, is a court to balance the government’s inter-
est in a fair and impartial system of justice and a
lawyer’s interest in the right to express his or her
views in an intellectually honest way? Better simply
to decide that the speech of lawyers is subject to reg-
ulation in a given context, reasoning by analogy
from similar cases involving some relevantly similar
category of speakers. Naturally, the determination
that two categories are relevantly similar is itself a
contestable one, but it will usefully expose the nor-
mative issues that undergird the legal doctrines. The
constraint of making principled distinctions, or plau-
sible analogies, ensures that judicial decisions and
actions by state agencies are justified on the basis of
generally applicable political and moral principles.70
When one examines the underlying constitution-
al principles, one cannot help but be struck by the
extent to which decisions by courts considering First
Amendment arguments by lawyers are out of touch
with the mainstream of constitutional law. While
generally applicable First Amendment law is aston-
ishingly protective of expression, even when it
imposes high social costs,71 the decisions of courts in
lawyer-speech cases cluster around the opposite
extreme. They generally acquiesce in the govern-
ment’s asserted reasons for protecting speech, even
where these reasons have been unavailing in other
contexts. Protecting the public image of the bar, for
example, has been deemed a legitimate state interest,
justifying regulations on expression, even in light of
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the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine,
which does not permit restrictions on speech to be
justified by similar concerns.72 Furthermore, the
vision of robust, open, vigorous public debate
announced by the Supreme Court in New York Times
v. Sullivan73 has not been carried through by lower
courts into a protective rule for criticism of partici-
pants in the judicial system. Judges, perhaps realiz-
ing that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander, also uphold decency and dignitary restric-
tions on speech critical of the judiciary, despite a con-
sistent line of cases protecting undignified and inde-
cent speech, subject only to narrow exceptions for
obscenity, and making clear that the offense of a lis-
tener is alone no basis for restricting expression.74
Finally, courts relax their customary scrutiny of
vague and overbroad statutes, permitting enforce-
ment of prohibitions on “offensive personality” and
“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar,” again
notwithstanding the Court’s concern that vague reg-
ulations may be selectively enforced against the
powerless or unpopular.75
As a result of this disjunct, the First Amendment
cases involving expressive activities by lawyers may
be construed to support the organized bar’s effort to
prevent hateful and obnoxious applicants from gain-
ing admission to the bar, but I believe that would be
a mistake. Bar admissions cases such as Converse,
which approved the Nebraska Bar’s denial of the
application of the student who printed the “Deanie
on a Weenie” shirts, are inconsistent with a signifi-
cant body of Supreme Court law. Landmark free
speech decisions such as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,76
Cohen v. California,77 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,78 and
Texas v. Johnson79 stand for the principle that obnox-
ious speech that causes substantial emotional dis-
tress to listeners is nevertheless protected. The fact
that the speaker in question is an applicant to join the
bar does not permit the state to enforce viewpoint-
based regulations on speech, or to take actions that
have the effect of creating viewpoint discrimination.
Indeed, the applicant’s status as a would-be lawyer
should afford him with heightened expressive liber-
ties. Although a significant ethical dimension of the
lawyer’s role is to serve as an officer of the court, it is
important to remember that lawyers are sometimes
the voices of the powerless, and that these voices
may not always be pleasant to hear. We may be con-
fident that hateful lawyers, who seek cover under
the mantle of dissent and civil disobedience, are ulti-
mately in the wrong. Even if we are correct, howev-
er, it is well to be skeptical about reposing the capac-
ity to make these judgments with state actors.
I do not mean to suggest that state bar associa-
tions and courts are powerless to enforce any restric-
tions on lawyers’ speech. In contexts in which a
lawyer would not have had the right to speak as a
non-lawyer, such as a courtroom, her expressive
rights may be restricted to further goals related to
the judicial system. Thus, lawyers’ speech in trials,
depositions, formal and informal pretrial proceed-
ings (such as letters to other lawyers), and court fil-
ings may be subject to reasonable regulations. This is
the rule that emerges from Gentile. It bears empha-
sizing, however, that this principle is not a conse-
quence of the lawyer’s surrendering speech rights
that she would have enjoyed as a private citizen, in
exchange for a state-granted license to practice law.
When individuals are admitted to the bar, they do
not lose expressive rights that they had possessed as
private citizens—they are still entitled to criticize the
law, write letters to the editor, engage in vitriolic
debate, or even spend their spare time working as
white supremacist advocates. Decent people hope
that Matthew Hale’s ambitions will be thwarted, but
the Constitution prohibits state bar associations from
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preventing him from becoming a lawyer on the basis
of his odious beliefs.
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